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NOTES
FAMILY LAw-In re Department of Public We!fare, 1981 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 1157,421 N.E.2d 28.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 15, 1981 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in
an opinion written by Justice Liacos, issued a decision that reversed
and remanded an order of the probate court which had granted a
petition by the Department of Public Welfare to dispense with the
need for the consent of a mother to her child's adoption. l The order
I. In re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1157, 1158,421 N.E.2d 28, 29.
The petition was brought pursuant to MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3 (West Supp.
1982-1983) which provides:
.
§ 3. Dispensing with required consent in certain cases; child under care of
charitable or public institution; notice of petition
(a) Whenever a petition for adoption is filed by a person having the care
or custody of a child, the consent of the persons named in section two, other
than that of the child, shall not be required if:
(i) the person to be adopted is eighteen years of age or older, or if
(ii) the court hearing the petition finds that the allowance of the petition
is in the best interests of the child, as defined in paragraph (c).
.
(b) The department of social services or any licensed child care agency
may commence a proceeding, independent of a petition for adoption, in the
probate court of Suffolk county or any other county in which said department
or agency maintains an office, to dispense with the need for consent of any
person named in section two to the adoption of a child in the care or custody of
said department or agency. Notice of such proceeding shall be given to such
person in a manner prescribed by the court. The court shall issue a decree
dispensing with the need for said consent or notice of any petition for adoption
of such child subsequently sponsored by said department or agency if it finds
that the best interests of the child as defined in paragraph (c) will be served by
said decree. Pending a hearing on the merits of a petition filed under this para
graph, temporary custody may be awarded to the petitioner.
(c) In determining whether the best interests of the child will be served by
granting a petition for adoption without requiring certain consent as permitted
under paragraph (a), the court shall consider the ability, capacity, fitness and
readiness of the child's parents or other persons named in section two to assume
parental responsibility and shall also consider the ability, capacity, fitness and
readiness of the petitioners under paragraph (a) to assume such responsibilities.
In determining whether the best interests of the child will be served by
issuing a decree dispensing with the need of consent as permitted under para
447
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by Justice Liacos remanded the case to the probate court for a deter
mination as to the mother's current fitness to care for her child. 2 The
current state of Massachusetts law required such a finding 3 and re
quired that findings be both specific and detailed. 4 Yet In re Depart
ment ofPublic We!fare 5 [In re DPW] is important for reasons that go
beyond the significance of the case for this mother, Brenda, and her
child, Shari. Justice Liacos articulated a new standard for the deter
mination as to when parental rights may be terminated. 6 This new
standard, if applied with care and discretion, can help many of the
children of this Commonwealth who are currently in a state of limbo
within the foster care system. 7 Furthermore, this standard, if applied
within the context of a social service system that fulfills its mandate
to preserve family integrity,S should not encroach anymore than nec
graph (b), the court shall consider the ability, capacity, fitness and readiness of
the child's parents or other person named in section two of chapter two hundred
ten to assume parental responsibility, and shall also consider the plan proposed
by the department or other agency initiating the petition.
If said child has been in the care of the department or a licensed child care
agency for more than one year, in each case irrespective of incidental communi
cations or visits from his parents or other person named in section two, irrespec
tive of a court decree awarding custody of said child to another and
notwithstanding the absence of a court decree ordering said parents or other
person to pay for the support of said child there shall be a presumption that the
best interest of the child will be served by granting a petition for adoption as
permitted under paragraph (a) or by issuing a decree dispensing with the need
for consent as permitted under paragraph (b).
Id.
2. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1179,421 N.E.2d at 40.
3. Id. at 1178,421 N.E.2d at 39; see Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 576-78,410
N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (1980). "[Tlhe critical question is whether the natural parents are
currentlyfit to further the welfare and best interests of the child." Id. (emphasis added).
4. This standard of proof was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). There, the Court, through Justice Blackmun,
held that the higher level of clear and convincing evidence was required before parental
rights to the care and custody of a child could be terminated. Id. at 747-48. The Massa
chusetts courts have held that specific and detailed findings do not measure up to the
level required by Santosky, and have ordered remands to determine whether findings
will stand under this higher scrutiny. Custody of a Minor, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1088, 1089,
436 N.E.2d 172, 173 (1982), appeal denied, 386 Mass. 1105,438 N.E.2d 75 (1982).
5. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1I57, 421 N.E.2d 28 [hereinafter cited as In re DPW1.
6. Id. at 1175,421 N.E.2d at 38; see infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
7. See generally A. GRUBER, FOSTER HOME CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS (1973).
8. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 1 (West Supp. 1983) provides:
§ 1. Declaration of policy: Purpose
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this commonwealth to direct its
efforts, first, to the strengthening and encouragement of family life for the pro
tection and care of children; to assist and encourage the use by any family of all
available resources to this end; and to provide substitute care of children only
when the family itself or the resources available to the family are unable to
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essary upon the rights of parents to the care and custody of their
children. 9 It is the purpose of this note to show how this new stan
dard can serve the interests of both parents and, even more impor
tantly, children.
II.

FACTS

. When Shari was born in 1975 her mother, Brenda, was serving a
prison sentence at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in
Framingham [MCIF].10 Pursuant to MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 119
§ 23A, II Shari was accepted into the custody of the Department of
Public Welfare and placed in the care of a foster family.12 To facili
tate visitation, Shari had been originally placed with a foster family
who resided near MCIF.13 Brenda, who is black, had requested that
Shari be placed with a member of her extended family or, alterna
tively, with a black foster family.14 Neither of these requests were
complied with and the testimony at the hearing was conflicting re
garding the Department's efforts to comply. IS During this incarcera
tion Brenda and Shari had weekly visitation until April, 1976. 16
From this point on, the contact between Brenda and Shari became
sporadic. The visits, when they took place, went well, but they did
not occur with any regularityP Brenda's contact with the Depart
ment was also sporadic, although Brenda again requested that Shari
be placed with her family.ls Again, the testimony at the hearing was
conflicting regarding the actual effort of the Department to comply
with Brenda's request. 19 By March, 1978, the Department had con
cluded that Shari needed a permanent placement and, thus, obtained
temporary legal custody of her. Shortly thereafter the Department
provide the necessary care and protection to insure the rights of any child to
sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral development.
Id.
9.

See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rights of

parents.
10. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1158,421 N.E.2d at 28.
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 23A (West 1969) provides that U[a]ny child
born to an inmate of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Framingham. . . shall
be accepted by the department. ..." Id.
12. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1158,421 N.E.2d at 29.
13. Id. at 1160,421 N.E.2d at 30.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1160 n.2, 421 N.E.2d at 30 n.2.
16. Id. at 1161,421 N.E.2d at 30.
17. Id. at 1161-63,421 N.E.2d at 30-32; see also Appellant's Brief at 50-53 app., In
re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1157,421 N.E.2d 28.
18. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1163,421 N.E.2d at 32.
19. Id. at 1164 n.5, 421 N.E.2d at 32 n.5.
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filed the petition to dispense with Brenda's consent to Shari's adop
tion.20 On June 9, 1978, Shari was placed with a black foster family
who were to become Shari's adoptive parents. 21
On April 22, 1980, the Department's petition was granted. 22 On
appeal Brenda challenged the decision on several grounds. She al
leged that, pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210 § 3, the Depart
ment did not have legal custody of Shari as the Department acted
incorrectly when it took custody of her under ch. 119 §§ 23A and
23C. 23 Brenda next argued "that the Department violated its own
regulations and failed to follow the statutorily declared policy of the
Commonwealth to strengthen and encourage families."24 She fur
ther argued that the standard of proof applied by the Common
wealth, specific and detailed findings, was too low, and that the clear
and convincing evidence test should be applied. 25 While none of
these arguments were successful, Brenda was successful in showing
that the probate court did not affirmatively find her to be currently
unfit. 26 Justice Liacos made a careful and detailed survey of the
Massachusetts case law regarding the requirement of a finding of
parental unfitness. 27 He also engaged in a comprehensive discussion
on "the principle that a child's interest is best served in a stable, con~
tinuous family environment."28 He concluded that "the term 'unfit
ness' signifies something more than a standard by which we measure
the limits of acceptable parental conduct. The term is a standard by
which we measure the circumstances within the family as they affect
20. Id. at 1164, 421 N.E.2d at 32. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 119, § 23C (West.
Supp. 1983) provides that "[t)he department may seek and shall accept on order of a
probate court the responsibility for any child under eighteen years of age who is without
proper guardianship due to the ... unavailability, incapacity or unfitness of the parent
or guardian. . . ." Id. As Brenda was not at MCIF, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119
§ 23A (West 1969), no longer applied.
21. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1164, 421 N.E.2d at 32.
22. Id. at 1158, 421 N.E.2d at 29.
23. Id. at 1165,421 N.E.2d at 32. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3 (West Supp.
1983) requires that the Department have the care or custody of child when they file the
petition.
24. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1169, 421 N.E.2d at 35; see supra note 8
and accompanying text.
25. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1176, 421 N.E.2d at 38. Clearly, this argument would
have been successful today. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
26. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1179, 429 N.E.2d at 40; see supra notes 1-2 and accom
panying text.
27. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1171-72, 421 N.E.2d at 36. See generally Note, King
Solomon's Couri: Reconciling the Interests of Parent, Child and State Under Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 119, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 853 (1980).
28. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1172-73, 421 N.E.2d at 36-37.
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the child's welfare."29 The resulting standard thus necessarily incor
porates the concept first stated by the court in 1959 that
When a child is placed. . . in a good family the inevitable conse
quence will be that firm bonds of affection and confidence will
rapidly arise on both sides. The damage to the child . . . from
breaking these bonds is something which even competent psychia
trists may be unable to predict. In the absence of compelling stat
utory command, such a breach should not be permitted lightly at
the request of either of the natural parents. . . . The interests of
the natural parents must be completely subordinated to the per
manent interest of the child. 30

Justice Liacos held in In re .DPW that
[N]atural parents may not be deprived of the custody of their mi
nor children in the absence of a showing that they 'have grievous
shortcomings or handicaps that would put the child's welfare in
the family much at hazard' or 'unless some factor such as lengthy
separation and a corresponding growth in the ties between the
child and the prospective adoptive parents indicate[s] that the
child would be hurt by being returned to the natural parents.'3l

Justice Liacos ordered a remand to determine whether a reunifi
cation of Shari with Brenda would have long-term, devastating ef
fects. If such was determined, there would be no further visitation. 32
The intent of the standard thus becomes clear: if a child has a strong
tie to prospective adoptive parents, and the severance of that tie
would be harmful to that child, the natural parent is considered unfit
to parent that child. While the court made it quite clear that it was
not adopting a per se rule whereby prospective adoptive parents who
are a child's psychological parent33 would automatically prevail over
natural parents,34 the impact of the standard will have such an
effect. 35

29. Id. at 1173-74,421 N.E.2d at 37.
30. Id. (citing Adoption of a Minor, 338 Mass. 635, 643, 156 N.E.2d 801, 806-07
(1959).
31. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1175,421 N.E.2d at 38.
32. Id. at 1179, 421 N.E.2d at 40.
33. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
34. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1175 n.16, 421 N.E.2d at 38 11.16.
35. See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of different stan
dards for termination of parental rights.
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ANALYSIS

The Psychological Parent Doctrine

In In re DPW the court used the term "minor child's psycholog
ical parents" in a footnote which attempted to limit the application
of the standard. 36 The understanding of this term is important in
order to appreciate the vast significance to a child of a standard that
utilizes this concept.
While the term "psychological parent" gained notoriety in 1973
with the publication of the seminal work by Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud and Albert SoInit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,37 the
term was described in an earlier Yale Law Journal student note. 38
Psychological parentage, or bonding may be described as
[T]he mutual interaction between adult and child, which might be
described in such terms as love, affection, basic trust, and confi
dence [which] is considered essential for the child's successful de
velopment, and is the basis of what may be termed psychological
parenthood. . . while, at birth, a biological parent's potentiality
for establishing such a relationship may be greater, no such imbal
ance exists after a third party has had custody for a period of time.
After a period of separation from the biological parent and care
by a third party, the child may learn to look upon the latter as his
psychological parent; any prior relationship with the biological
parent may deteriorate to the point where it is not only sup
planted, but also incapable of resuscitation. Where this has hap
pened, a change in custody based solely on biological
relationships might, by disrupting the existing relationship of psy
chological parenthood, work considerable emotional harm upon
the child; it could even cause him to refuse to enter a new
relationship.39

Other commentators have also written about the concept of psy
chological parentage. They have stressed that it is essential to the
welfare of the child that courts consider the child's psychological re
lationship to the adults involved in the case as paramount to their
decision. 40 Goldstein, Freud and SoInit are unequivocal in their be
36. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1175 n.16, 421 N.E.2d at 38 n.16.
37. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973). [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS).
38. Note, Alternatives to "Parental Rights" in Child Custody Disputes Involving
Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963).
39. Id. at 158-59.
40. See, e.g., id. at 159 n.38 ("In the third party situation, the most frequently
overlooked criteria of psychological significance are the preferences of the child, the im
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lief that the disruption of this relationship is extremely painful and
harmful to the child and it is from their work that much of the subse
quent literature in this field stems.41
The standard adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court in In re
DPW, while not creating a per se rule, does in fact permit the termi
nation of parental rights on the finding that the child will be hurt by
removing her from the care of her psychological parents.42 If one
accepts the theory that a child will be hurt by such a disruption, it
becomes clear that the practical result of this standard is that the
rights of a parent will be terminated upon a finding that the child has
psychological ties to her caretakers.

portance of the affections and attachment of the child toward the third party, and the
possible effects of a disruption of this relationship."); see also Mnookin, Child-Custody
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face 0/ Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 226, 286 (1975) ("While the proposition has not been empirically proven, the risks
of removing the child from a 'psychological parent' for placement with a psychological
'stranger' would seem to outweigh the psychological benefits the child might receive by
maintaining a better sense of lineage by living with the natural parent."); Foster & Freed,
A Bill 0/ Rights For Children, 6 FAM. L. Q. 343,350 (1972).
It is patent nonsense to presume that the best interests fo a child will be served
by being taken out of an adoptive home and returned to a natural mother. On
the contrary, assuming a satisfactory mutual adjustment, it is adverse to the
child's best psychological developmental, and physical interests to precipitously
remove him from the security and warmth he has known and to deprive him of
his psychological parents.
Id.; Coleman, Standards/or termination of Parental Rights, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 315, 337
(1980).
Society has not established a method to assure that each child develops an af
fection relationship. . . . These relationships cannot be doled out like food
stamps or medical care, nor does it appear that such a development is likely in
the foreseeable future. Therefore, the relative importance of affection relation
ships in the child rearing system is exemplified . . . by the great weight such
relationships are given in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. . . .

Id.
41. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS supra note 37, at 31-34. Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit define psychological parent as the relationship that:
results from day-to-day attention to [the child's) needs for physical care, nour
ishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. Only a parent who provides for
these needs will build a psychological relationship to the child on the basis of
the biological one and will become his "psychological parent" in whose care the
child can feel valued and "wanted."
Id.; see also Wald, State Intervention on Behatf of Neglected Children: Standards For
Removal of Children From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care,
and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 668 (1976).
42. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1175,421 N.E.2d at 38; see supra notes 31-34 and ac
companying text.
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B. Rights of Parents
The difficulty with this interpretation of the standard articulated
in In re .DPW is that it appears to effectively truncate the legitimate
rights of parents to the care and custody of their children. 43 The
United States Supreme Court has "by now made it clear beyond the
need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to 'the
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her chil
dren' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.'''44 The
Massachusetts courts have also recognized that the natural rights of
parents are a " 'private realm of family life which must be afforded
protection from unwarranted state interference.' "45
Despite the need for children to be placed permanently with
caretakers with whom they have a psychological attachment,46 "[t]he
best of intentions and the greatest zeal to care for neglected, depen
dent, or delinquent children do not justify the violation of the consti
tutional provisions as to due process that are involved in removing a
child from the custody of its parent.' "47 It was the interest of pro
43. See In re Juvenile Appeal, 177 Conn. 648, 661, 420 A.2d 875, 881 (1979). "To
the ordinary fears in placing a child in foster care should not be added the concern that
the better the foster care custodians the greater the risk that they will assert, out of love
and affection grown too deep, an inchoate right to adopt." Id. (citing Spence-Chapin
Adoption Servo v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196,205,274 N.E.2d 431, 436, 324 N.Y:S.2d 937, 945
(1971).
44. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981) (citing Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645; 651 (1972». Despite this statement of the importance of parental
rights, the court in Lassiter held that a parent has no due process right to counsel in a
termination proceeding but rather than such a decision should be made on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 31-32. In dissent, Justice Blackmun deemed parental rights "to be among
those 'essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men' . . . ." Id. at 38 (Black
mun, J., dissenting.); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing
the "court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family
life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Quil
loin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soci
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). This liberty
interest has even been extended, in a limited way, to foster families. See Smith v. Organ
ization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977).
45. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 748, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (1978); see In
re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 376 Mass. 252, 264, 381 N.E.2d 565, 572 (1978). "Indeed,
because the interest in family integrity is fundamental in nature, it has been held that
certain types of official intrusion into this private realm may be justified only when fur
thering a 'compelling state interest.''' Id.; see also Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B.,
379 Mass. 1,3-4, 393 N.E.2d 406, 408 (1979) (holding that in Massachusetts, parents do
have a due process right to counsel in termination proceedings).
46. See supra note 41.
47. Campbell, The Neglected Child: His and His Family's Treatment Under Massa
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tecting this fundamental right that led to the decision in Santosky v.
Kramer, requiring clear and convincing evidence before parents
rights were terminated. 48 The requirement in Massachusetts law
that a parent be found currently unfit also has its basis in the sub
stantial respect accorded family autonomy.49
There are, however, occasions, when a natural parent does not
give a child adequate care. It is in those situations when the state, in
its tole as parens patriae, may step in and assume the care of that
child. 50 While the parens patriae role should be minimized, and
when utilized done so in a way that will preserve rather than sever
familial bonds,51 there are occasions when bonds must be severed.
The task of preserving parental rights and protecting children be
comes, at this point, a matter of achieving a balance between parents
with a right and children with a need.

C. The Balancing Process
The Massachusetts courts have struggled to reconcile the three
sets of competing interests; the natural rights of the parents, the
parens patriae duty of the state and the needs of the child. 52 The
conclusion of the courts as to which interest shall predominate is
clear. ~'[T]he dependent child's needs are paramount, and only with
hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative
values, to a position secondary to what the mother claims as her
rightS."53 The Supreme Judicial Court stated in 1907 that its "first
chusells Law and Practice and their Rights Under the Due Process Clause, 4 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 631, 664 (1970) (citing In re Godden, 158 Neb. 246, 252, 63 N.W.2d 151, 156
(1954».
48. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
49. Id., at 753; see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
50. Custody of a Minor, 377 Mass. 876, 880, 389 N.E.2d 68, 72 (1979); see also In
re New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 641-42, 328 N.E.2d 854, 860
(1975).
51. Campbell, supra note 47, at 632-38.
52. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 776. See also Wald, State Intervention on Beha!l of "Ne
glected" Children: A Search/or Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 989 (1975).
53. Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 743, 393 N.E.2d 836, 843 (1979); see also
Custody of a Minor, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 294 n.4, 432 N.E.2d 546, 550 n.4 (1982),
rev'd, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1088,436 N.E.2d 172 (1982), appeal denied, 386 Mass. 1105,438
N.E.2d 75 (1982).
There is no doubt that the child is a beautiful, loving alert little girl, who has
come to love and thrive under the care of two beautiful people, [foster parents].
To take the child out of that environment would seem almost criminal.
However, when one discusses the matter with the biological parents, the
thought of denying them of the right to their child has a chilling effect.
Id.
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and paramount duty is to consult the welfare of the child"54 and
went on to state in 1928 that "[t]o that governing principle every
other public and private consideration must yield."55 The court con
tinues to use this language today. 56
This is not an invitation to a carte blanche approach to the ter
mination of rights, for the difficulty persists in determining when the
needs of the child become paramount. 57 A concept that can provide
guidance to the courts in these instances is the notion that the rights
of the children to be placed in permanent homes with a psychologi
cal parent should be accorded the same constitutional protection as
the parent's fundamental rights to the care of these children. 58 If one
views the issue as competing sets of constitutional rights, it becomes
easier to justify balancing one against the other.
D.

The Constitutional Rights of Children

Although it has yet to gain legal recognition, commentators
have suggested that children should have a fundamental right to be
raised in a permanent home and that right be constitutionally guar
anteed and protected.59 The Bill of Rights for Children60 states that
A child has a moral right and should have a legal right:
1. To receive parental love and affection, discipline and gui
dance, and to grow to maturity in a home environment which en
ables him to develop into a mature and responsible adult. . . .
8. To emancipation from the parent-child relationship when that
relationship has broken down and the child has left home due to
abuse, neglect, serious family conflict, or other sufficient cause,
54. In re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 903, 429 N.E.2d 1023, 1025
(1982).
55. Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 199, 80 N.E. 802, 805 (1907).
56. Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 553, 180 N.E. 508, 511 (1932).
57. See, e.g, In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at lin, 421 N.E.2d at 36.
58. See, e.g., In re New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631,641
42,328 N.E.2d 854, 860 (1975). The court had difficulty in reaching its decision to termi
nate the mother's rights as the parent and child had been separated for only a brief time
when the petition was brought. Id. at 644-45, 328 N.E.2d at 862.
59. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
60. Musewicz, The Failure 0/ Foster Care: Federal Statutory Reform and the Child's
Rightto Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 633, 647, 650, 655, 663 (1981); see also Muench
& Levy, Psychological Parentage: A Natural Right, 13 FAM. L. Q. 129, 129 (1979);
It is the thesis of this article that foster children have a substantive due process
right under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
to be free from ill-advised state action in the determination of their psychologi
cal parent, and that custody of the foster child should therefore go to the psy
chological parent even when the psychological parent is the foster parent.
Id.
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and his best interests would be served by the termination of paren
tal authority.61

A judicial determination that the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States guarantees each child the right to a
permanent placement would be a logical result from the Court's
demonstrated awareness of this need. 62 Given, however, the fact
that it does not appear likely that the United States Supreme Court
will articulate this new fundamental right, it remains to the individ
ual states to determine how to best serve their children's needs and
rights. The standard adopted by Massachusetts is a positive step to
see that children have the right to be placed with their psychological
parent.

E. M ode/ Termination Standards
Commentators in the field have argued for two different ap
proaches to determine when parental rights should be terminated.
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit originally advocated the use of a flex
ible standard, one that made use of three guidelines to determine
placement. 63 The guidelines were drawn to assure that children
would be placed with adults who were or were likely to become the
children's psychological parents. 64 To facilitate the decision were
the following criteria: (1) that placements protect the child's need
for continuity of relationships,65 (2) that placements consider the
child's and not the adult's sense of time,66 and (3) that placements
reflect the law's inability to supervise interpersonal relationships and
its limited capacity to make long-range predictions. 67
In 1979, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit reappraised their ap
proach to termination. 68 They came to the conclusion that specific
statutory periods were the most reliable indicators and least detri
mental alternatives with which to give legal recognition to psycho
61. Foster & Freed, supra note 40, at 347.
62. Musewicz, supra note 60, at 672-73.
63. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 37, at 48. "The process through
which a new child-parent status emerges is too complex and subject to too many individ
ual variations for the law to provide a rigid timetable." Id.
64. Id. at 31.

Id.
66. Id. at 40. "A child's sense of time is based.on the urgency of his or her instinc
tual and emotional needs and thus differs from an adult's sense of time." Id. at 98.
67. Id. at 49.
68. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 13-14 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS).
65.
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logical parent and child relationships.69 They believed that the
period of time needed to decide who the child's psychological par
ents were could result in intolerable periods of uncertainty.70 They
thus adopted the position of the commentators who recommended a
termination statute based on the length of time a child was in foster
placement.71
Commentators who advocate for the adoption of a time-in
placement statute hope to provide a balance between the protection
of children and the protection of parental rights. 72 The termination
statutes must be fair and workable, and must guarantee all parties
both substantive and procedural due process. 73 As the goal is to
achieve permanence for the child, the statute must provide that the
child will be freed for adoption after a minimum period in place
ment if there is no real likelihood that the child will return to the
natural home in the foreseeable future.1 4 Only a showing of compel
ling reasons to the contrary should prevent the adoption. 75
69. Id. at 42.
70. Id. at 43; see also Mnookin, supra note 40, at 218. "[F]lexible discretionary
standards . . . will too often result in children being left in limbo for years because of
repeated routine extensions, even though it is improbable that the child will ever go
home." Id. at 281.
71. Id. at 280.
The most direct way of [knowing when to encourage development of new ties
rather than reunification with the biological family] would be to require the
judge at the end of a fixed period of time to proceed on the assumption that the
child will not be returned to his natural parents and that the primary role of the
state is to find an adoptive home or some other stable, long-term environment.
The law should be changed to provide final termination of parental rights at the
end of the required period if the child could not be safely returned to the home
and if the state had made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents while the
child was away from home."
Id.
72. Musewicz, supra note 60, at 646.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Commentators recommending the adoption of a time in placement statute
include Mnookin, supra note 40; Musewicz, supra note 60; Coleman, supra note 40; Katz,
Freeing Children For l'ermanenll'lacement Through a Model Act, 12 FAM. L. Q. 203
(1978); and Wald, supra note 41.
For a sample termination statute see INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,
STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT 157-58 (Tent. Draft 1977).
8.3 Standard for termination when child is in placement.
A. For children who were under three at the time of placement, a court
should order termination after the child has been in placement for six months,
if the child cannot be returned home at that time, unless the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that an exception specified in Standard 8.4 applies.
B. For a child who was over three at the time of placement, the court
should order termination after the child has been in placement for one year if
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The standard articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court in In re
DPW clearly does not implement a time in placement standard for
the termination of parental rights. 76 The practical effect of the stan
dard, however, may be the same. The important distinction is that,
in a time-in-placement statute, there has been a legislative determi
nation that bonding has occurred. In Massachusetts, the determina
tion is made by the court.
F. Protection

of Parents

It is reasonable to suggest that socially disadvantaged persons
may fear that a time-in-placement statute, or a standard such as the
one articulated in In re DPW, could be used against them as a means
of permanently depriving them of their children. 77 Poor people be
come involved in the system with much greater frequency than do
people from other classes. Often the social workers are from the
middle class and reflect a bias that is class-based in nature. 78 The
courts, however, do not attempt to insure that each child lives in an
the child cannot be returned home at that time, unless the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that an exception specified in Standard 8.4 applies.
However, if at the six-month review hearing the court finds that the parents
have failed to maintain contact with the child during the previous six months
and to reasonably plan for resumption of care of the child, the court may termi
nate parental rights unless one of the exceptions specified in Standard 8.4 ap
plies.
c. Whenever parental rights have been terminated under subsections A.
and B. because the child falls within one of the exceptions, the case should be
reviewed every six months to determine whether the exceptions continue to be
applicable. If not, termination should be ordered.
8.4 Situations in which termination should not be ordered.
Even if a child comes within the provisions of Standard. . . 8.3, a court
should not order termination if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that
any of the following are applicable:
A. because of the closeness of the parent-child relationship, it would be
detrimental to the child to terminate parental rights;
B. the child is placed with a relative who does not wish to adopt the child;
C. because of the nature of the child's problems, the child is placed in a
residential treatment facility, and continuation of parental rights will not
prevent finding the child a permanent family placement if the parents cannot
resume custody when residential care is no longer needed;
D. the child cannot be placed permanently in a family environment and
failure to terminate will not impair the child's opportunity for a permanent
placement in a family setting;
E. a child over age ten objects to termination.
Id.

76. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
77. Musewicz, supra note 60, at 747.
78. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equity & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
834 (1977).
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ideal environment. If that were the case there would be very few
families that would not require intervention by social services. 79
The legitimate fears of parents could be minimized if foster care
reforms such as case management, foster care review, and pre-place
ment preventive services were adopted. 80 The foster care system
must be designed to facilitate maintaining the parent-child relation
ship by encouraging family reunification and visitation. 8!
.
Implicit within the Massachusetts Regulations Governing the
Department of Social Services82 is the position espoused by the com
mentators to protect the child and safeguard family integrity. The
regulations provide standards for substitute care,83 service plans,84
Wald, supra note 52, at 1037.
80. Musewicz, supra note 60, at 747.
81. Id. at 644.
82. MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 110, §§ 1.00-20.00 (1979).
83. Id. § 5.05.
(1) Except in an emergency, the department shall provide substitute care only
when preventive services have failed and the family itself or the resources
needed and provided to the family are unable to ensure the integrity of the
family and the necessary care and protection of the child. A full range of
preventive and supportive services shall be provided to the family which
would enable a child to remain at home and avoid placement.
(2) Substitute care shall . . . only be provided when there is a service plan
which. . . shall consider the following alternatives of substitute care:
(a) placement in the child's own home;
(b) placement with relatives;
(c) placement in family foster care;
(d) placement in community residential care.
(3) To the maximum extent feasible, out-of-home substitute care shall con
form to the following requirements:
(a) it is the least restrictive setting for the child;
(b) it has the least drastic impact upon the existing family unit after pro
viding for the needs of the child;
(c) it is in close proximity to the home of the child's family;
(d) it shares the racial, cultural and linguistic characteristics of the child's
family;
(e) it will allow for frequent visits between child and his/her family; and
(1) it can serve as the placement for any of the child's siblings in the
department's custody.
79.

Id.
84. Id. § 5.08.
(2) Any service plan which recommends out-of-home placement. . . and
(3) Shall specifically address the following placement goals:
(a) return to or reunification with the child's immediate family;
(b) return to or reunification with a member of the child's immediate
family;
(c) adoption, where reunification is not possible;
(d) short-term family foster care which is goal-directed;
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case review,85 procedural safeguards,86 and visitation. 87 Strict adher
(e) short-term treatment in community residential care which is goal
directed;
(f) long-term family foster care or community, residential care but only
under extraordinary circumstances where none of the above place
ment goals are possible; and
(g) self-sufficiency.
Id.
85. Id. § 5.09.
(I) An initial review of all voluntary and involuntary placements in substitute
care under sections 5.11 or 5.12 of these regulations shall occur within six
(6) weeks of the initial placement. The initial review shall be conducted
by the social worker assigned to the case, his/her supervisor, and the pro
vider of substitute care. The written record of the initial review shall be
entered into the case file.
(2) A full case review of all voluntary and involuntary placements in substi
tute care under sections 5.11 or 5.12 of these regulations shall occur within
three (3) months of the initial review and every three (3) months thereaf
ter. Written findings shall be made and entered into the case record. The
case review conference shall include the social worker, parents, any ma
ture child and the substitute care provider. A copy of the written findings
shall be provided to the parents and the mature child.
Id.
Id. § 5.14
The department and providers shall adhere to the following procedural
safeguards:
(I) Notice of Intent to Petition the courtfor Custody
(a) Except in an emergency, the department or provider shall give prior
written notice to the parent(s) and any mature child of the intent to
petition the court for a transfer of custody. The notice shall be given
at least two (2) weeks in advance of the intended legal action and
shall speciry the nature of the hearing and how counsel may be ob
tained. The decision to petition the court for custody shall be ap
proved by the social worker, the supervisor and an attorney licensed
to practice law in the Commonwealth. . . .
(2) Notice of Intent to Change Placement or Visitation
(a) Except in an emergency, the department or provider shall give
prior written notice to the parent(s) and any mature child of any
intended change in placement or visitation. The notice shall be
sent two (2) weeks in advance of the intended action and shall
contain a notice to the parties of their rights to file a grievance
under Chapter 10.00 of these regulations.
86.

Id.
Id. § 5.15.
Frequent and regular visits between children in substitute care and their
parent(s) and siblings shall be used to improve and strengthen the family rela
tionship and to prepare for the child's return to the family.
(1) Frequency of Vis,ls-Parents shall have the right to visit weekly with their
child unless the child's physical or emotional health would be endangered.
If so, the social worker shall document the reasons, receive the written
approval of the area director, and include the documentation in the case
file. In the event that parents object to the schedule of visits, they shall be
87.
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ence to these regulations should have the result of avoiding place
ments from the outset, and facilitating reunification if placement
cannot be avoided. Thus, the right of both the parents and the chil
dren are protected. If, however, reunification is not possible, if the
child does develop a psychological tie to the foster parents, the needs
of the child will be met by terminating the parents' rights in accord
ance with the standard imposed by In re .DPW. Assuming the regu
lations were followed, the parents' fundamental rights will have been
accorded the deep respect they deserve. 88 Finally, there is case law
that holds, in dictum, that "there may be cases in which agency ac
tion with respect to a family has been so arbitrary and irrational as
to warrant a dismissal of the child custody petition."89 Agencies and
social workers should be held accountable to uphold the basic policy
of the Massachusetts social service system. 90
IV.

CONCLUSION

Given the standard articulated by the court in In re .DPW, as
suming that on remand the court finds that Shari will be harmed by
informed of their right to file a grievance under Chapter 10.00 of these
regulations.
(2) Place of Vifits-The location of visits shall be selected to provide an at
mosphere in which parent(s) and child will be able to relate in a relaxed
manner. The social worker shall attend visits only if a parent or child
request his/her presence or if the need for staff presence has been estab
lished and included in the service plan. Area offices shall not be used for
visits unless the social worker can demonstrate that the child's physical or
emotional health would otherwise be endangered.
(3) The right to weekly visits shall not apply to any child whose parent(s) have
voluntarily consented to his/her adoption pursuant to G.L. c.21O, section

2.
(4) The right to weekly visits shall not apply in any case in which the depart
ment or provider has filed a petition to dispense with the need for parental
consent to adoption pursuant to G.L. c.21O, section 3. In such a case, the
department or provider shall petition the probate court to make an appro
priate order regarding visits.

Id.
88. See Wald, JUpra note 41, at 676-80 for a discussion of a system for reuniting
families.
89. In re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 376 Mass. 252, 269, 381 N.E.2d 565, 574 (1978).
But see Wald, JUpra note 41, at 692 n.269.
Are we prepared to say that an endangered child should not be removed be
cause the state has not provided services that might-have kept the family intact,
when such services do not exist? Are we going to deny a child in foster care a
permanent home because the state has not helped her parents regain custody,
thereby consigning the child to impermanent foster care?
Id.
90. See JUpra note 8.

1983]

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

463

breaking her tie to her foster parents, Brenda's rights to Shari will be
terminated. This note takes the position that that would be the cor
rect decision and would grant Shari her right to a permanent place
ment with her psychological parents. It need not have been the
inevitable decision.
Shari was removed from her mother at birth because Brenda
was incarcerated. 91 It is possible for the legislature to change the
current system, and preserve parent-child relationships by allowing
children to remain with their mothers while the mother is incarcer
ated. 92 This would preserve the bond between a natural mother and
her child. Furthermore, if the Department fully complied with its
regulations by encouraging regular visitation93 when the parent and
child must be separated, the impact of the temporary separation
would be lessened. 94 Parental rights would only need to be termi
nated in extreme cases where it would not be possible to maintain an
emotional bond between the parent and the child. 95
It is most likely too late to create a psychological parent rela
tionship between Brenda and Shari. Shari should be accorded her
right to a permanent home, a right that can clearly be implied from
the standard. 96 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, however,
should take the responsibility to gamer its resources and apply the
tools at its disposal97 to protect the emotional tie between a natural
mother and her child.
Nancy B. Alisberg

91. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
92. Note, Mothers Behind Bars--A Look at the Parental Rights ofIncarcerated Wo
men, 4 NEW ENG. 1. ON PRISON L. 141, 151 (1977).
93. See supra note 87.
94. Note, On Prisoners and Parenting: Preserving the Tie that Binds, 87 YALE L.l.
1408, 1416 (1978).
95. Id. at 1423.
96. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
97. These tools include the policy to preserve the family, see supra note 8, the regu
lations, see supra notes 82-87, and the case law reflecting the importance of family integ
rity, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.

